Recently, a new privacy-preserving elliptic curve based grouping proof protocol with colluding tag prevention (CTP) has been proposed. The CTP protocol is claimed to be resistant against colluding tags attacks in which the involved tags can exchange some messages via another reader before the protocol starts without revealing their private keys.
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Juels (Juels, 2004) proposed a new security notion called Yoking Proofs. The proposed scheme enables the generation of a proof which shows that a pair of RFID tags are scanned simultaneously by a reader. Yoking proofs were later generalized to grouping proofs which indicates that multiple tags participate in the generation of a proof (Sai, ; Bolotnyy and Robins, 2006) . By adopting grouping proofs, the manufacturer can prove to its customers that the referred products are sold at the same time. For example in a phar macy store, some drugs must be sold according to the recipe. For inpatients, the medical staffs can guarantee the authentication and integrity of a group of medical items like inpatient bracelets and the containers of drugs (Huang, 2008) . For car industry, a grouping proof ensures that all components of a car are assembled in the same factory (Juels, 2004; Sun et aI., 2009) .
Recently, Batina et at have proposed a new privacy preserving elliptic curve based grouping-proof protocol with colluding tag prevention (denoted by CTP protocol) (Batina et aI., 20 \ 0) . The protocol is claimed to be resistant against all active attacks applied on the previous grouping proof protocols and also fulfil the privacy against a narrow-strong adversary. The notion of the CTP protocol is mainly derived from the latest version of their elliptic curve based authentication protocols called EC-RAC III (Lee et aI., 2010) .
With elliptic curve cryptography emerging as a serious alternative, the desired level of security can be attained with significantly smaller key sizes. This makes ECC very attractive for devices with limited computational capabilities.
On the feasibility of implementing ECC on RFID tags, one may argue that it is too heavy to be deployed on low cost tags such as EPCglobal Class-\ Generation-2 standard tags. Nevertheless, there have been many proposals so far such as (Batina et aI., 2010; Kumar and Paar, 2006; Furbass and Wolkerstorfer 2007 ' Sakiyama et aI., 2008; Hein et aI., 2008) .
' ,
Our Co ntribution.
In this paper, we present a colluding attack against the CTP protocol. We show that two colluding tags are able to complete a run of the CTP protocol successfully and generate a valid grouping proof with the presence of only one of the tags. Then, we propose a new grouping proof pro tocol based on elliptic curves which fixes the problem.
Outline.
The remainder of this paper is orga nized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the CTP protocol and its security claims, then Section 3 presents a colluding attack scenario against the CTP protocol. In order to fix the problem, a new grouping protocol is proposed in Section 4 with its security analysis. In Section 5, we compare our proposal with the CTP protocol from security and computation perspectives and finally Section 6 concludes the paper.
THE CTP PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe the CTP protocol. But first we explain the notations and assumptions used hereafter.
• P: Elliptic curve base point.
• TA, TB: Tag A and tag B respectively.
• R: Reader.
• V: Verifier.
• y, y = yP: Verifier's private and public keys respectively.
• Sa , Sh: Tag A and tag B's private keys respectively.
• x(T): x-coordinate of point T on the elliptic curve.
• PAB : grouping proof of tag A and tag B.
Assumptions
It should be noted that the CTP protocol is executed under following assumptions:
• There are three entities involved in the protocol:
some tags, a reader and a verifier.
• The task of the reader is to coordinate the exe cution of the protocol, collect the grouping proof and forward it to the verifier. The reader is not necessarily trusted by the tags or the verifier.
• The verifier is trusted and the public-key Y of the verifier is a publicly known system parameter. Only the verifier knows the corresponding private keyy.
• Knowledge of y is a necessary requirement to check the correctness of a grouping proof. The re sult of a verification claim is failure, or it reveals the identities of the involved tags.
• It is hard to solve the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem, i.e. given P and aP in Elliptic Curve with a randomly chosen in 7/.,q = [O,q -Il, it is hard to compute a.
• It is hard to solve the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem, i.e. given P, aP, bP with a and b randomly chosen in 7/.,q and given cP = abP with probability � and cP = dP with probability � with d randomly chosen in 7/.,q, it is hard to decide whether abP equals cP .
Description
Without loss of generality, we explain the two-party version of the CTP protocol. This protocol can be easily extended to more than two tags as described in (Batina et aI., 2010) .
The two-party version of the CTP protocol is shown in Fig whether the following equations hold.
where Sa and Sb are the public keys of TA and TB re spectively and are registered in the database of the verifier. If so, the grouping proof is accepted.
Security Claims
Due to its construction, the CTP grouping-proof pro tocol is claimed to inherit the security properties of the EC-RAC III authentication protocol (Lee et aI., 2010). The EC-RAC III latter is designed to provide secure entity authentication against an active adver sary, and was infonnally shown to be equivalent to the Schnorr protocol (Schnorr, 1989) .
The security claims on the CTP protocol can be di vided into to two different security issues, Privacy and Forgery prevention of the grouping proof.
1 Privacy
In ( Referring to this classification, the CTP protocol is claimed to be narrow-strong private, although no for mal proof for this is given in the original paper. This claim has been recently invalidated by Lv et al in (Lv et aI., 2011) . However, verification of this claim has not been addressed in this paper.
Forgery Prevention
Being a grouping proof protocol, the CTP must pre vent the generation of a valid grouping proof without the involved tags actually participating in the proto col. This implies that the protocol must resist against the following potential attack scenarios:
• Compromised Tag. One tag is compromised, the reader is non-compromised.
• Man-in-the-middle Attack: The reader is compro mised (the tags are honest).
• Colluding Reader and Tag. The reader and one of the tags are compromised.
• Colluding Tags. The reader is non-compromised, both tags are compromised. The tags can ex change some messages in advance (e.g., via an other reader), but do not know each other's private key.
• Replay Attack Performed by an Outsider. An eavesdropper scans two non-compromised tags simultaneously and replays the copied message flow to impersonate the two tags.
The CTP protocol is claimed to be resistant against the impersonation of a tag in all of the above attack scenarios. Namely,an adversary needs to either know the private-key of that particular tag or be able to solve the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem to im personate it in this protocol. This claim has been addressed through this paper and an attack, which negates this claim, will be described in the next sec tion.
OUR COLLUDING TAGS ATTACK
In this section, we elaborate an attacking scenario against the CTP protocol. In our attack, we take the colluding tags scenario which implies that the reader is trusted, but both tags are compromised, and tags can exchange some messages in advance (e.g. via an other reader), but they do not know each other's pri vate key. Our attacking scenario is divided into two phases:
conspiracy phase and deceit phase. In the conspir acy phase, the two tags secretly negotiate via a rogue reader (Reader*). In this negotiation, as Figure 2 shows, one of the tags (e.g. tag B) sends H = sbY to tag A. H is the point multiplication operation of tag B's private key (Sb) and verifier's public key (Y) on the Elliptic Curve group. It should be mentioned that message H does not reveal any information on Sh due to discrete logarithm (DL) problem.
Having H known, tag A is able to impersonate tag B in the CTP protocol. Figure 3 shows the detail of a successful completion 
Th,2 = (rbY +x(r,Ta,dshY) = (rbY +x(r,Ta, I )H) (5)
As it can be seen, knowing H = shY is adequate to im personate tag B in the CTP protocol without revealing any infonnation about its private key Sb.
PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In Section 3, we showed that the CTP protocol is vul nerable to some colluding tags attacks. In this section, we propose a new scheme based on elliptic curve no tion with the same security level fr om privacy per spective but resistant against colluding attacks from forgery prevention perspective.
Description
Our proposal is based on an authentication proto col proposed by Bringer et al. called "Randomized Schnorr" (Figure 4 (Bringer et aI., 2008) . This pro tocol has been fonnally proved to be narrow-strong private.
The two-party version of our proposed protocol is shown in Figure 5 . The reader initiates the interroga tion by sending the messages "start left" to one of the tags (TA). Then, TA generates two random numbers aa and � " and computes their point multiplication on P and Y Elliptic curve points respectively (Ta,l = auP, Ta,2 = �uY ) and sends it to the reader in return. The reader then initiates a simultaneous interrogation with another tag (TR) by transmitting the "start right" mes sage following by a random challenge generated by the reader r,\ and T",2 received from TA. TE com putes n.1 = abP and n.2�bY, the same as TA did. In addition, it also generates a scalar number th.3 = (ah + �h +x(r,Ta,2)Sh) mod q. Then, all of the three generated messages are transmitted to the reader. The reader passes tb.3 to TA and the protocol concludes by transmission of scalar ta.3 = aa + �a + th,3S " from TA to the reader. The grouping proof, collected by the reader, consists of the tuple (6). PAE = {T",I,1;,,2, Ta,3,r,\, Th, I, Th,2, Th.3}
(6)
To verify the grouping proof constructed by TA and TE, the verifier checks whether the Equations (7) and (8) hold.
3) (ta,3P -1;,,1 -yl Ta,2) (7)
x-I (rsTa,2) (tb,3P -n,1 -yl n,2Q8)
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our proto col in the same security framework used for the CTP protocol.
Privacy
Th eorem 1.
Assume the hardness of the DDH problem, then Randomized Schnorr is narrow-strong private.
Proof: (Bringer et al., 2008) Th eorem 2. Assume that the Randomized Schnorr is narrow-strong private, our proposed protocol is privacy-preserving against narrow-strong adversary.
Proof: As explained, to prove the privacy, it is necessary to prove that we can simulate the tags out puts. In the following, we construct a simulation and we show that an adversary who is able to distinguish between this simulation and the outputs of genuine tags in the proposed protocol will be able to do the same for the Randomized Schnorr protocol. The outputs of the tags in the proposed are as following:
TA: Ta.1 = aaP , Ta.2 = � "Y, ta.3 = a " + � " + th.3S" TR: n.1 = abP, n,2 = �bY ,tb,3 = (ab + �b + x(rsTa,2)sh)
The outputs of each tag is easily mapped on the outputs of a generic tag in the Randomized Schnorr protocol, namely r., = aP , T2 = �uP ,y = a + � + sc.
In other words, the proposed protocol is simply two 
Tag B
Sb runs of the Randomized Schnorr protocol regarding the tags outputs. This simply proves the privacy attribute inheritance of the proposed protocol from the Randomized Schnorr protocol.
Forgery Prevention
Th eorem 3. Assume the Schnorr scheme is secure against active impersonation attacks, then Random ized Schnorr is secure against active impersonation attacks.
Proof: (Bringer et aI., 2008) Th eorem 4.
Assume the randomized Schnorr scheme is secure against active impersonation at tacks, then our proposed protocol is secure against active impersonation attacks.
Proof: It is obvious that interrogation of TA in the proposed protocol is a complete run of the Ran domized Schnorr protocol and inherits the security attribute of the Randomized Schnorr protocol stated in Theorem 3. The interrogation of TH, however, is slightly different from a normal run of the Random ized Schnorr protocol. So, in our proof we focus on the right part of the protocol runs between the reader and TH. In order to proof the theorem, we devise a proof by contradiction approach. Assume there exists an active adversary 5'L against the proposed protocol. Given a system of tags 'I and a reader executing the Randomized Schnorr protocol, we transform the tags' normal outputs to simulate tags' outputs in the proposed protocol. So doing, we convert 5'L into an adversary against the Randomized Schnorr protocol.
First, when 5'L interrogates TH, she sends rs and �1,2 to the tag. We intercept this message. Then, tag outputs Tl = Tb.l and T2 = Ta,2. We intercept these two messages and send back c = x(rJ'a,2) to the tag. The tag responses y = (ab + �b + CSb). We forward this message to the adversary as tb.3 = y. Clearly, from 5'L 's point of view, TA is using the proposed protocol. Now, 5'L tries to impersonate TB by interacting with the reader. First, we pick a random number r.: and one random Elliptic curve point T;, 2 and send them to 5'L. As 5'L is able to impersonate TH against the proposed protocol then she is able to compute a couple tuple T£ .l = a�P, T£ .2 = ��y and t� .3 = (a� + �� + x(r;r; .2 )sD on receiving the challenges such that there exists an Sb verifying S� = s�P = x -I (rJ'a,2) (tb3P -Tb,1 -y-l Th,2). For this reason, we are able to uniquely compute Tl and T2, to receive a challenge c and to compute y such that there exists an I with 1= cl (yP -r., -ul T2)'
In this way, we showed that by using 5'L, we are able to impersonate TB against the Randomized Schnorr protocol which negates our assumption. One can demonstrate that to impersonate a tag in either of the attack scenarios stated in Section 2.3, the adversary needs to know the private-key of that particular tag (or be able to solve the DDH problem). (8) show that this number is six in our protocol. This implies that our proposed protocol imposes more computational overhead to the verifier than the CTP protocol. But this is trivial due to higher computational capabilities of the verifier in compar ison to the tags. On the tag side, the fifth column shows the number of ECPM needed for a tag during one run of the protocol. This number is the same for both protocols as they both impose two EC point mul tiplications on each tag, e.g. tag A needs to do two EC point multiplications for both protocols to calculate �l, 1 and �1,2.
COMPARISON

CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a successful col luding tag attack on the CTP grouping proof proto col. This implies that the CTP protocol is not able to prevent colluding tags attacks as claimed. The main weakness in the protocol that we have exploited is that the necessary information required to impersonate a tag in the protocol is not structurally restricted to be its private key. It was shown that the point multipli cation of a tag's private key and the verifier's public key, which does not reveal any information about the tag's private key, can be exploited by colluding tags to generate a grouping proof with presence of only one of the tags. In order to fix this problem, we proposed a new group ing protocol based on elliptic curves which prevents Narrow-strong (Fonnally proved) the colluding attacks and proved its security proper ties. In summary, compared to the CTP protocol, our proposal has the following properties:
• Formally provable narrow-strong privacy.
• Formally provable prevention against forged proof generation.
• The same amount of computational overhead on tag sides.
